


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# **OPERATION TALLY HO**

**21 NOV '66**

**HQ PACAF  
Directorate, Tactical Evaluation  
CHECO Division**

**Prepared by: Mr. Warren A. Trest  
S.E. Asia Team**

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12AF . . . . .	1 Cy (56)	ATC (ATXDC) . . . . .	1 Cy (66)
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FOREWORD

The following Special Report on Operation Tally Ho represents the development of the air interdiction program in the DMZ from its inception on 20 July 1966 through 31 Aug 1966. The results of this action, as reflected in official correspondence, reviews and interviews, are significant in evaluating the area denial operations, under the Tally Ho concept. This program, which was a follow-on to "Tiger Hound" (air interdiction in Laos), began 30 miles inside the southern perimeter of Route Package 1 in NVN, then expanded to include the DMZ.

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T A L L Y H O

INTRODUCTION

Operation TALLY HO was initiated on July 17, 1966, with first air strikes being flown on July 20. Employing much the same principles as those followed in the successful TIGER HOUND campaign in Laos, the TALLY HO program was designed to interdict enemy forces infiltrating through the demilitarized zone (DMZ) into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).<sup>1/</sup> Infiltration through the DMZ had accelerated greatly since March 1966 when air strikes began to score impressively in the Tiger Hound area. Routes supporting this infiltration through the DMZ were 1A, 101, 102 and 103. Route 1A was the principal route to Dong Hoi, and along with 102, provided access to the DMZ Area. From here supplies must be carried across the DMZ and Ben Hai River into SVN by porters or pack animals.<sup>2/</sup> (See Figure 1).

Prior to TALLY HO operations, there was no effective border surveillance program. Effective ground surveillance did not exist. Visual reconnaissance, like photo-reconnaissance, was periodic and restricted by the terrain and vegetation. However, intelligence sources verified that storage facilities were being expanded in the DMZ and that the DMZ logistical system along Route 102 was being developed.<sup>3/</sup>

Even more important, intelligence firmly established that the 324th B Division of the NVN army had crossed the DMZ and had massed in Quang Tri province. This was the first full division ever reported to have infiltrated from the north. It numbered 8,000 to 10,000 men, and

[REDACTED]

its apparent mission was to deliver a sudden and overwhelming attack upon the two northernmost provinces of the RVN. <sup>4/</sup>

To counter the enemy's plan, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, ordered a spoiling operation. Designated Operation HASTINGS, it involved several battalions of US Marines, together with sizable RVN army and marine units. Operation HASTINGS was launched on July 7 just below the DMZ. Ambushes and close range fire fights began almost at once. After a week of heavy fighting, the Hastings task force, supported by artillery and air strikes, was well on its way toward routing an organized enemy which was well supplied from the north. The big question, however, was what to do about the infiltration routes through the DMZ, and the supply and reinforcement caches which had been stored in the controversial buffer zone. <sup>5/</sup>

COMUSMACV had much earlier tried to obtain permission to conduct operations within the DMZ if the need arose. However, in early June 1966, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and COMUSMACV were advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that problems were being encountered at high levels in obtaining authority for military action in the controversial zone. <sup>6/</sup> On July 13, COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC again of the serious threat posed by NVN forces infiltrating through the DMZ, and requested the status of action which had been taken to obtain authority for air strikes in the DMZ. Additionally, COMUSMACV advised that US/RVNAF forces were operating close to the DMZ and outlined actions to be taken, pending receipt of instructions, to counteract VC/NBA forces who might use the DMZ as a sanctuary. <sup>7/</sup>




Figure 1

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CINCPAC replied, concurring in the proposed counteractions against VC/NVA forces in the DMZ, but only on the basis of right of self defense and the requirement of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. COMUSMACV was advised that firing or maneuvering forces into the DMZ on the basis of "attaining objectives in South Vietnam" was too broad a criterion to apply in case of the DMZ where military actions were likely to produce international complications. CINCPAC further directed that positive factual intelligence data be submitted immediately to that headquarters to support the contention that NVA was using the DMZ for military purposes. As soon as this information was furnished, CINCPAC would then request JCS expedite a decision. 8/

This evidence was furnished, and CINCPAC then advised JCS that "all evidence confirms MACV reports that NVA is transiting the DMZ not only at the western end, but through the central and possibly eastern area." It was felt that heavy interdiction of the enemy's extended supply lines through Laos together with extremely poor trafficability during the monsoon season would limit the enemy's ability to support offensive operations in the RVN for several months. CINCPAC further explained: 9/

"Heavy buildup in I Corps and expressed determination to continue large scale support to the VC requires NVA to seek multiple shorter routes of infiltration. This can only be through the DMZ. It appears that NVN has abandoned all pretense of respect for neutrality of the DMZ and is now embarked upon additional infiltration and supply means. COMUSMACV is now concentrating extremely heavy air operations both day and night in Route Package I and northern I Corps. The existence of a 10 kilometer prohibited strip lying across the entire battlefield could become an increasingly costly impediment to effect-

[REDACTED]

ive operations."

In his message to CINCPAC, General Westmoreland restated a need for B-52 attacks against Laos, authority to operate in the DMZ, and more effort in Route Package I on interdiction. Along with other air matters, these three points were continuously discussed with Lt Gen William W. Momyer, Seventh Air Force (7AF) Commander, during the first two weeks in July. At one of these sessions in mid-July, General Westmoreland asked General Momyer to read his message to CINCPAC, and they also discussed a message from CINCPAC which stated that some of the 7AF effort diverted from Route Packages V and VI-A into Route Package I should go into Route Package II. The message directed 7AF to work this out with the Navy. General Westmoreland, not wanting to let up on the effort in Route Package I, discussed the feasibility of thinning out effort in TIGER HOUND and STEEL TIGER using these resources to go into Route Package II. General Momyer pointed out that he had to keep the scheduled effort against oil and railroads in Route Packages V and VI-A, but agreed that more effort could be shifted into Package II providing suitable reconnaissance was agreed to by the Navy. It was established that the Air Force would work with the Navy through the coordination committee on <sup>10/</sup> the reconnaissance and strike effort which would be put into Package II.

Considerable discussion followed the report by MACV that a NVN division had positioned itself in Laos opposite Route 9. General Westmoreland thought this division would likely have the objective of securing Route 9 in order to provide logistical support to the 324th B Division, which was being engaged by the Marines in Operation HASTINGS. It was also

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
likely that Route 9 would be the main route for reinforcements. Another consideration was that the division would move to the north of Route 9 and bypass Khe Sanh which was astride this route. In any event, General Westmoreland requested that General Momyer have his MSQ plot the position of posts on Route 9 so they could be given air support in bad weather if necessary. General Momyer replied that this was not a problem as most of the outposts were already plotted. <sup>11/</sup>

#### ESTABLISHING OPERATION TALLY HO

General Westmoreland then approached the need for an increased effort in Route Package I. He asked General Momyer to develop a plan like TIGER HOUND for the southern part of Route Package I, which would eventually include the DMZ if and when authority to conduct operations there were received. It was agreed that the 7AF Commander would establish such an operation, to be known as TALLY HO. It was also agreed that the Air Force <sup>12/</sup> would intensify the reconnaissance effort in the DMZ.

Earlier, with the advent of Operation HASTINGS, the Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Air Force, requested that COMUSMACV authorize Marine air elements to move into the DMZ and the southern portion of Route Package I. During the course of discussion with COMUSMACV, General Momyer pointed out that it was not operationally sound to give the Marines a slice of Route Package I. It was considered mandatory that the Air Force maintain control of all air operations to prevent mutual interference. This was even more important considering the increased scope of air operations planned for the area. <sup>13/</sup>





Subsequently, on July 18, COMUSMACV advised the Marines that their request for authority to conduct air operations in Route Package I was not approved. He advised that the 7AF Commander was to implement TALLY HO in the immediate future to restrict the flow of personnel and supplies from NVN. The Marines were further advised that their participation in TALLY HO was authorized, and that direct liaison with the 7AF Commander was authorized for the purpose of coordinating continuing Marine participation in the operation. 14/

In discussing his concept of operations for TALLY HO COMUSMACV felt that the program could profit from the experience, the techniques and procedures learned during Tiger Hound. He said: 15

"Planning for Tally Ho should visualize a marked increase in air surveillance effort in Route Package I to locate and destroy vehicles, supply caches and logistical areas. These should be taken under attack, waging the same type of devastation and destruction that was characteristic in Tiger Hound. One of the objectives will be to force the enemy to employ a large civilian workforce to maintain the line of communication, and it will be our purpose to initiate a stepped up psywar leaflet campaign designed to weaken the will of this labor force and hopefully to disperse it under the constant hazard of air attack."

General Westmoreland made it clear that TIGER HOUND was not to be abandoned. He stated that "the emphasis now is to develop a new operation to correspond to the pattern of enemy action in the new area of enemy build-up. The weight of our air effort must be placed where the enemy is putting the weight of his effort, and where targets are now located. The enemy's operational area has shifted; we must shift." The general estimated that TALLY HO would probably continue into January 1967, when it was likely that the emphasis would shift back into the TIGER HOUND area. 16/

[REDACTED]

Planning and preparations for TALLY HO got underway immediately. General Momyer directed his intelligence staff to analyze in detail potential targets for attack in the area immediately north of the DMZ. At first, JCS targets and armed reconnaissance targets (ART), provided the only source for targeting. These were not considered favorable in view of the fact that most of them were on the eastern seaboard and consisted of bridges and interdiction points. This coastal area was flat terrain, and as had been discovered in Laos and NVN, the enemy was very good at bypassing targets in such an environment. To offset this lack of favorable targets, the level of reconnaissance sorties was increased in the DMZ and the area immediately to the north. Also, visual reconnaissance (VR) by FACs was planned. <sup>17/</sup>

#### TASK FORCE STRUCTURE

The basic structure for the TALLY HO task force was already in existence. A joint service task force had been formed with the TACC at Tan Son Nhut AB in December 1965 to conduct TIGER HOUND operations. Col I. B. Jack Donalson was the Tiger Hound Commander, answering directly to the TACC which was directed by Col. C. M. Talbott. Colonel Donalson had an integrated staff of USAF, USA and USMC personnel serving under him in the areas of intelligence and operations. The task force further consisted of a TIGER HOUND unit at Da Nang AB and four outlying FAC sites at Khe Sanh, Kontum, Dong Ha and Kham Duc. As TIGER HOUND operations were being thinned out concurrent with the inception of TALLY HO operations, it was decided that the TIGER HOUND staff would manage TALLY HO. TIGER HOUND procedures were to be used to achieve maximum interdiction of the enemy forces immediately south of the DMZ, immediately north of the DMZ, and along

[REDACTED]

the Laos border in the Lao Bao area. TIGER HOUND was authorized to be phased down to 15 to 20 strike sorties per day. As an objective, approximately 80 sorties per day were to be utilized in the TALLY HO operation, and they were to be furnished from in-country resources. <sup>18/</sup>

In laying out the plans for TALLY HO, Colonel Talbott stated that the concept of operations hinged "on visual reconnaissance performed principally by airborne FACs flying in pairs in O1Es." The range of VR was to be extended with the use of USAF A1Es and US Army OV-1 SLAR aircraft. Plans called for the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), call sign Hillsboro, to operate with both TIGER HOUND and TALLY HO forces. Requests for air strikes were normally forwarded by the FAC to the ABCCC to accomplish necessary coordination, providing strike aircraft with all necessary information. When the ABCCC was not airborne, strikes were made through any available CRP or the I Corps DASC. The agency receiving the request then requested approval from the TACC, who in turn, scrambled or diverted strike aircraft through normal procedures. Flights were authorized to be diverted from TIGER HOUND into the TALLY HO area depending upon such factors as weather and operational requirements. <sup>19/</sup> (See Fig. 2.)

#### PROCEDURES AND AIRCRAFT EMPLOYMENT

From the outset, 7th Air Force officials were concerned about the use of O1Es in the TALLY HO area. On the first day that COMUSMACV approached the subject, Lt Gen Momyer advised him that they would have to "feel their way" on the use of O1Es as FACs. He pointed out that Route

# TALLY HO AREA AND AIR RESOURCES




Figure 2

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Package I was an entirely different environment compared to TIGER HOUND, and A1Es might be required due to concentrated enemy ground fire in the area. 20/

The TALLY HO area was more heavily defended than any portion of TIGER HOUND. 21/

Although basic procedures employed in the TALLY HO area were generally identical to those employed in the TIGER HOUND program, TALLY HO operations had to be approached more cautiously. The 7AF Commander directed that the O1Es be escorted by A1Es and work only in areas where they could survive. This permissive area was established as being in the western mountainous area, with the O1Es probing gently into the eastern sector. This limitation on the FACs had its drawbacks, because the eastern portion of TALLY HO contained the principle motorable routes. In the western area, the mountainous terrain was heavily canopied by foliage. Where in the TIGER HOUND area, the FACs had flown just over the tree tops spotting trucks and storage areas, they were required to fly at an altitude of 1500 feet in the TALLY HO area, and this made it very difficult to spot lucrative targets. The concept, however, was to be cautious at first until such time as the FACs became familiar with the areas and the defenses could be "rolled back" to permit FAC reconnaissance and controlled strikes throughout the area. Thus, it was planned that the largest portion of the strikes at first were to be armed reconnaissance and only a few hard targets, controlled by FACs, were to be scheduled and struck. 22/

The A1E aircraft which provided escort/fire suppression, were also used for visual reconnaissance. All FAC and VR aircraft were directed to avoid heavy defense areas and to maintain radio contact with the ABCCC. The O1Es

[REDACTED]

were directed to fly in pairs and to maintain visual or radio contact with other aircraft when Hillsboro was not airborne. The ABCCC and FACs were authorized to divert strikes to targets of opportunity within the existing rules of engagement. <sup>23/</sup> They were required to avoid the DMZ at first, until approval was granted to strike that area on July 22. Also, since the rules specifically prohibited Thailand-based aircraft from striking in the RVN, they were advised to execute extreme caution in diverting aircraft into TALLY HO to avoid that portion of the DMZ south of the demarcation line. <sup>24/</sup> FACs were authorized to divert RVN-based strike aircraft to alternate targets in the I Corps area when TALLY HO strike areas were obscured. If these aircraft could not contact FACs and were unable to strike their assigned targets, the flight was then directed to conduct armed reconnaissance along another LOC in the TALLY HO area. <sup>25/</sup>

#### FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

All FACs working the Tally Ho area were volunteers from the Tiger Hound program. The decision was made that TALLY HO FACs would work from one detachment, located at Dong Ha-- the northernmost site approximately six miles below the DMZ. There had been a much smaller TIGER HOUND detachment at Dong Ha before TALLY HO -- three aircraft and six FACs. Volunteers from the TIGER HOUND FAC force moved in place on July 19 and began operations on July 20 with 8 aircraft and 12 FACs. <sup>26/</sup> (See Fig. 3.)

Major Robert T. Smyth, the Chief TIGER HOUND FAC, who had been located at Khe Sanh, was called in to lead the FAC detachment at Dong Ha. Major Smyth had previously expressed a desire for permission to probe





Figure 3





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north with the O1E. He recalled that Lt Gen Momyer had visited Khe Sanh on July 16. The major said that on this visit, "we discussed the feasibility of operating north. General Momyer said we would hear something in a couple of days." Within two days, Major Smyth was advised by Lt Col Edward Abersold, TALLY HO Advanced Commander, that he would move from Khe Sanh and take over the detachment at Dong Ha. Flying under the code name Hound Dog, Major Smyth had eleven FACs working for him. On several occasions, LtCol Abersold flew up from Da Nang and also flew missions. <sup>27/</sup>

#### RESTRICTIONS

Operations were severely limited at the beginning of TALLY HO due to the restrictions placed on the DMZ. Even if FACs were fired upon while flying over the DMZ, MACV directed that no strikes could be called into the area. <sup>28/</sup> The first VR sorties in the DMZ allowed only a small portion of the western side to be observed. Within this small section, TALLY HO FACs observed a complex trellised network in what appeared to be an elaborate bivouac area. The FACs requested the decision to avoid the DMZ be reconsidered because of the distance involved in flying around it from Dong Ha and indications that the area should be observed. <sup>29/</sup> This request was initially disapproved because operations were not authorized in the DMZ. <sup>30/</sup>

Also, at the beginning of TALLY HO, FACs were excluded from night operations. The primary objective of night operations was to search out and destroy targets of opportunity - vehicles. Alternate objectives were

[REDACTED]

to deny the enemy free access to the route by continued surveillance and to interdict LOCs. A search element composed of Army Mohawk Side Looking Radar (SLAR) aircraft, call sign - Spud, and C-130 flare aircraft, call sign - Blindbat, flew at night and provided target information to all night armed reconnaissance sorties directed down the LOCS. Additionally, strikes were directed against fixed targets at night by utilizing the MSQ skyspot radar bombing technique. <sup>31/</sup>

#### INITIAL OPERATIONS

TALLY HO operations began on schedule, July 20. The TALLY HO strike force was initially composed of USAF and USMC aircraft. These were being flown both day and night and averaged approximately 82 sorties per day. In addition to these, other strike aircraft scheduled into ROLLING THUNDER, BARREL ROLL or STEEL TIGER that could not strike their primary target due to weather were diverted into TALLY HO. On the first day of operations, 30 Marine sorties were fragged. Twenty-one strikes were made, with nine not expending. No Marine night missions were flown initially. Eighteen USAF day sorties were fragged, and eighteen conducted. Twelve ALE sorties were fragged, with four not expending. Eight OLE sorties were flown. <sup>32/</sup>

*Sorties from 18 Aug 68*

Inclement weather severely hindered operations on the first day. Recalling his first flight in the TALLY HO area on the 20th, Capt Clyde, Hound Dog 66, said: "I was fragged with Hound Dog 71, Captain Kirwin, for what we call the Sierras area. We left Dong Ha and proceeded out into the weather ... a pretty bad weather day. Moving out to the west about 20 to 30 miles, we tried to go under the weather and had no luck

[REDACTED]

at all. So we climbed through until we got pretty good visibility and continued west. Finally, we came to a road neither of us recognized and we started following it generally to the northeast. The road was in good condition." 33/

"We were about 3,000 or 4,000 feet. I was flying lead and Kirwin was on wing. Then, at the same instant he caught tracers going by me, I caught muzzle flashes on the ground. Immediately, we broke to the west and moved out of the area. There were four gun positions on the ground. We didn't know where we were, so we couldn't give good coordinates to Hillsboro on this, but we did report it. From there, we flew back southwest following the road and after considerable time, we came to one of our old TIGER HOUND targets, which I recognized as Target 26. This road eventually came into Route 9 and 99 in TIGER HOUND, near Tchepone. Actually, on our first day we got considerably north and northwest of our area. Near the Mu Gia Pass, I would say." 34/

From the very first, pilots flying in TALLY HO's western mountainous sector faced a problem which had not been encountered in TIGER HOUND. This was the problem of turbulence. Captain Clyde commented on this: 35/

"This is some of the worst turbulence I've experienced in the O-1. You get all sorts of crazy currents coming down off the mountains. You have a lot of trouble trying to climb. You add climb power to the aircraft, try to pull the nose up, and you have 500 feet per minute descent with climb power on and nose pulled up at a 50 degree angle. In some of these areas, it's awfully hard to FAC. It affects the Als and a lot of other aircraft, too."

In spite of bad weather conditions on the first day, some of the FACs

[REDACTED]

were successful in locating lucrative targets. Recalling his first target in TALLY HO, Captain Anderson, Hound Dog 62, said: <sup>36/</sup>

"We started out at a minimum altitude of 1500 feet, using binoculars. We didn't use binoculars in Tiger Hound but they have proved very effective in Tally Ho. On the first day out Capt Don Curtiss, Hound Dog 72, and myself flew up to fragged target 1412, and we looked the target over. There was a well-used trail coming down to the river, and it seemed like smaller trails were diverted to foot trails. So we put a flight in-Hound Dog 72 did - and we uncovered a lot of stores, actually just south of 1412, and we decided to open it on up further to the south. After putting in a couple more flights, we uncovered numerous stores. We also got two structures and two trucks. As it turned out, we didn't realize that we had found such a large number of stores and didn't really concentrate the rest of the days activity on this target, which we should have done. The recce mission next day showed they had moved most of it out, including the part we had destroyed."

During the next few days, upon receiving authority to VR in the DMZ, FACs discovered considerable enemy activity in the DMZ area, and confirmed reports of Route 102 being a prime infiltration corridor. Noted were extensive trellis works, well used trails running into the DMZ and numerous structures. Three clusters of structures when struck on July 24, yielded several secondary explosions. <sup>37/</sup> The largest and one of the most important targets struck in the TALLY HO area was sighted on 25 July. <sup>38/</sup>

Early on the morning of the 25th, LtCol Abersold, Hound Dog 20, noted several revetted storage crates and stacks in the open just off the road near the intersection of Routes 101 and 102. This was just east of the TALLY HO area's center line approximately four miles above the DMZ. Lt Col Abersold had been directed into the area as the result of infra-red returns gathered at 0400 hours on the same morning by an RF4C. LtCol Abersold vividly recalled sighting this target: "Major Smyth and myself

[REDACTED]

went on recce north of the DMZ and spotted two trucks parked beside the road. I put two strikes in and got the trucks. I made a further inspection of the area ... what looked like a little turn off the road ... and sighted what looked to me like three trucks covered by foliage. I was sure they were trucks, but when I got the foliage blown off, it was a long line of supplies, maybe 200 feet long, ten feet high and ten feet wide. I turned it over to another FAC, and they started putting in strikes, and they started getting secondary explosions, and this went on for a day and a half. I estimate that a hundred tons of ammo went up,"<sup>39/</sup>

Throughout the day, a total of 50 strike aircraft from Da Nang, Chu Lai, Cam Ranh Bay and Pleiku bombed the ammunition dump. Over 200 secondary explosions were touched off in the vicinity of the target.<sup>40/</sup>  
<sup>41/</sup>  
The FAC detachment commander, Major Smyth, recalled:

"This was by far the largest ammo dump that I have ever seen. All FACs put strikes in on this area, an extremely large one. A very lucrative target. We put air in on it all day long up until 1900 or 1930 hours. We were getting large secondaries. One secondary every 15 or 20 seconds. On the next day, we went back and found another part of the dump and it was also extremely lucrative."

An additional thirty sorties were called in on the target the following day, accounting for at least thirteen secondaries. By this time, the Marines had routed the 324th B Division in Operation HASTINGS. Although the Marines were still engaged in cleaning up the area, the enemy force was sporadically withdrawing back through the DMZ. It was more or less accepted that the ammunition dump destroyed in TALLY HO was a major supply center for the 324th B Division, and the destruction of this target kept this force from being resupplied. Major Smyth said:

[REDACTED]

"We like to feel that it was reserve ammunition for the 324th B Division. It was close to the DMZ. There is no way we can prove this, but we feel that it is so. I certainly wouldn't say that the destruction of the dump was responsible for clearing the 324th B up and running them back across the border. The Marines did that. But, we feel that TALLY HO at least contributed by destroying all that ammunition which could have feasibly been used to resupply the enemy." <sup>42/</sup>

On another occasion, Captain Anderson was conducting VR in the DMZ, and found a communications line consisting of numerous telephone poles and wires leading approximately to the Laotian/Vietnamese border. He also sighted approximately twelve communications shacks with numerous wires leading out of one large center building. "We decided it was the headquarters for the communications line, and we struck and destroyed this," the FAC reported. "I think we got quite a bit of communications equipment out of this strike." <sup>43/</sup>

In assessing the value of this target the FAC pointed out: <sup>44/</sup>

"With regard to documented evidence that there is military activity by the NVN in the DMZ, take the strictly telephone type system which extends 25 miles straight down the DMZ and the poles planted right on trails, and you can easily see wires and insulators running along the trails. They have what appear to be way-stations along the routes with shacks along the side which could be either relay stations or telephone switches at that point. This certainly indicates it is military because there is no need for a civilian telephone system in the DMZ."

"When we first discovered the telephone system, we saw poles, etc, but we didn't define it immediately as a telephone system figuring they would have radios, rather than a hard system like a line system to maintain, but when we found these twelve communications shacks leading right off the main system of poles, we decided to destroy it. I don't think its been in operations since then, because secondary reactions have cut the

[REDACTED]

poles and knocked the lines down."

#### NIGHT OPERATIONS

Although many lucrative targets were being spotted and struck during daylight hours, it was obvious that most of the fleeting targets were to be found at night. Preliminary traffic analysis by the SLAR aircraft indicated that the peak traffic period was prior to midnight. After midnight, traffic appeared to concentrate in the area immediately north of the DMZ. <sup>45/</sup> A later analysis showed that there were numerous areas where movement regularly occurred in a linear pattern suggesting the presence of a road, and that many such patterns occurred where no roads existed on current maps. There was a definite flow pattern each night to the road traffic in the TALLY HO area. This pattern often reversed itself between 2300 and 0230 hours, and the pattern changed each night. <sup>46/</sup>

An attempt was made during the second week to evaluate a night program utilizing the OIEs. The OIEs flew a total of six sorties on three nights, and then the program was cancelled. In evaluating the effectiveness of this brief operation, Lt Col Abersold said: "We were able to pick up a lot of intelligence information. We were able to see a lot of moving traffic at night with field glasses and we also had a light intensifying scope (Starlight Scope). There was an observer in the back seat after the first night, and we could see a lot with the scope." <sup>47/</sup>

In his assessment of the OIE night program, Major Smyth said:



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"The night operation was L/Col Abersold's idea, and we sure are proud of him for it. We all feel that it is by far the most significant thing learned in the entire program. Finding these trucks during daylight hours is something else. Believe me when I say the North Vietnamese are experts at camouflage. It's great for a FAC to fly at night, to pull the power, and use the binoculars or the Starlight Scope, depending on the weather, and get down there and see a bunch of trucks moving down the road." 48/

In explaining why the program was cancelled, Lt/Col Abersold said: "There is a lot of activity up there at night, fighters, armed recce, flares and we need some sort of coordination agency, some controlling agency so they will know where we are flying and will know where they are. A couple of times I was flying along at night over Route 101, and a fighter came along and dropped six flares right over me. I made a pretty good target. So, that's why we discontinued it. We didn't have enough control, and we couldn't be sure that we were the only ones in the area." 49/

On August 18, Lt/Col Abersold visited Headquarters 7AF and briefed the TALLY HO Commander on his ideas concerning the effectiveness of the OLE night operations and plans for reinstating the program. Commenting 50/ on the concept for possible OLE utilization at night, Major Smyth said:

"First, the thing that we should be able to identify in those areas where we can operate safely is the number of vehicles, where the vehicles are parked generally, the routes they take and where they drop their supplies off. We should at least be able to find the frontline wholesaler so to speak. I also think we could conceivably present the biggest threat to the enemy at night. It is the first time to my knowledge that

[REDACTED]

we have used the OIEs in this type of operation, and we can present a big threat to truck movement. Movement is at night."

"Quite obviously, if we can limit his movement, we can expect a defensive reaction or response. We feel that probably the smartest thing we can do is to keep him from trying night operations and intelligence directly to the OI. By this, I mean, that on one night, the smart thing to do is back off a distance that the starlight scope would allow you from the critical intersection. Pick up trucks coming through the intersection and do nothing more than count trucks coming and their direction of travel. Perhaps, on the next night, change tactics entirely, pick up a truck convoy, follow it at an altitude of 3500 or 4000 feet with the power back, making every effort to keep our engine noise down and perhaps not let the trucks know we were above them. Perhaps we could follow the convoy right to where they are unloading, get coordinates on the site and ease on off. We would keep changing our pattern."

Major Smyth also felt that the FACs could call in strikes at night under certain conditions. He explained that should a FAC sight an unusually large convoy, "it would pay us to destroy both trucks and goods. We feel that with the Skyspot radar and control that we have this would not be really difficult. Ideally, we would like to do this without flares. If the weather permits a good moonlight night, fighters can see the road, and with the right types of ordnance, there is a good probability this can be done. In addition to getting trucks it would be psychologically frightening to the NVN truck driver to have aircraft suddenly whip down and run a string of CBU right down the road. We feel this could be accomplished by the FAC picking up the convoy, tracking it a safe distance, determining the best stretch of road where the trucks can't go off into the trees. There are many stretches of road cleared on either side. This way when they get there, they either have to keep moving or the truck driver stops, dismounts and gets away from the vehicle. We feel that, from our three nights experience, once you see the trucks you can easily

[REDACTED]

follow them, and using radar, we could mark with WP right behind the trucks, and the strike aircraft could make a run right down the road using CBU." <sup>51/</sup>

Earlier, after making a personal visit to the Tally Ho detachment at Dong Ha, General Momyer asked his operations staff to give him their recommendations on using the O1's at night. <sup>52/</sup>

The TALLY HO task force commander proposed "to employ them during daylight hours only." However, he stated, "As we develop further experience in the area, it may be desirable to attempt further night visual reconnaissance with this aircraft." <sup>53/</sup>

On August 28, the O1Es were allowed to go back into the area at night. They were fraggd on strictly VR missions, and had no authority to call strikes in on targets. A preliminary report indicated that during the period August 28 - September 1, that 29 confirmed trucks were sighted. Of these, only one was using lights. They were traveling at speeds up to 30 miles per hour. <sup>54/</sup>

#### HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

Whether it concerned day or night operations, the basic concept in O1E utilization was to keep these aircraft working within a permissive environment. The TALLY HO area, especially the eastern sector, was far from permissive. There was some minor difference in FAC evaluation of enemy defense tactics; however, all FACs agreed that the TALLY HO area was the most heavily defended area in which they had flown. Commenting on this, LtCol Abersold said, "In TALLY HO the first few days we noticed that nearly everybody down there had a gun and had no hesitation in using

[REDACTED]

it. We were shot at constantly." <sup>55/</sup>

Capt Anderson summed up the experience of most of the other FACs with enemy defense tactics when he said: <sup>56/</sup>

"Fire discipline is better in NVN than it was in the Tiger Hound area. They never fire at you here until they are almost certain to get a hit. They wouldn't fire at you even when you circled the area quite awhile. Then, as soon as you call the fighters in and you roll in to mark the target, giving them a stable target, they really open up with automatic weapons. Then, rather than roll in at 1500 feet, we started rolling in about 3000 and pulling out about 2500 feet, giving them less chance of getting us."

Capt Bronwood Harrison vividly recalled one of his experiences with the "guns." "I turned one target over to Sky Spot for night strikes," he said. "Sky Spot hit it with one flight about 2300 that night. The next morning, I headed immediately to these three structures to assess damage by Sky Spot ... very difficult to pick up because Sky Spot had rearranged some of the trees around the area, and I had to get down low again, approximately 800 feet to see. I did a 360 over the target, and just as I hit the clearing at the end of the 360, I was right in the middle of a firing range -- 30 to 40 people with semi-automatics caught me just as I went into the clearing. None hit me. At the same time as they started firing, I had a flight of four Navy A4s checking in right over me, so all I had to do was execute a 180 and marked with WP the area I wanted them to hit. Two flights of Hobos (ALE's from Pleiku) followed. We put frags in on the tree line where they were firing at us. First flight of Hobos to come in got ground fire, gave me a chance to spot the little guys down there shooting from this hole and I pointed

[REDACTED]

it out to Hobo. An estimated KBA of ten on that one. When we left, there was no fire at all. It was in the same general area as the large ammo dump we already hit." <sup>57/</sup>

Captain Harrison seconded Capt Anderson's comments on NVN fire discipline. He said that "apparently they got word up there on FAC procedures either in-country or in TIGER HOUND, because right from the start, we could fly over an area on VR and get little or no ground fire, and the minute we find what we think is a lucrative target and get a flight in the area, they open up. You roll in to mark, and as soon as you roll in they cut loose on you. Pretty heavy stuff. They are sharp and have refined weapons, and they seem to be pretty familiar with our procedures. They show a lot of restraint about not giving away their position until they have been caught." <sup>58/</sup>

Although the area was heavily defended from the beginning, LtCol Abersold estimated that it took about ten days for the enemy to really start opening up in "earnest". He surmised: "I figure from the time it took to start shooting at us with the real big guns in earnest was the time it took to react to our being in there and the time it took to get the guns in the area." <sup>59/</sup>

LtCol Abersold has good reason to remember the enemy's firepower. On August 1, his aircraft was hit by what he described as "something pretty big...37 or 57." The hit took four feet off the right wing of his aircraft. "Initially when I got hit, I thought my tail was gone because I wasn't getting any reaction out of the rudder at all, and my right wing dropped," he recalled. "I made a call on the radio and said

[REDACTED]

that I was hit and that I was going in. At the time I didn't think I was going to be able to control it. However, as the aircraft picked up speed at a 100 miles an hour, I was able to level the wings and I happened to be heading right for Dong Ha." LtCol Abersold brought the aircraft in; however, upon arriving at Dong Ha, other problems developed. He knew that he wouldn't be able to land the aircraft, that he would have to crash it. Hoping that he would be able to set it down on the end of the runway, he called and asked that the right side of the runway be cleared. However, as he approached the field, there was a marine truck at the end of the runway. After clearing the truck, he found that he was heading straight for the control tower. Rather than hit the people in the control tower, he cut power. He hit at a twenty degree angle at about 100 miles an hour. The pilot's comment: "I was extremely fortunate that day." <sup>60/</sup> (See Photo Figure 4.)

General Momyer was at Dong Ha on the day that LtCol Abersold's aircraft got hit. Upon returning to his headquarters at Tan Son Nhut, the general advised his intelligence staff of the information regarding the increased anti-aircraft fire throughout the TALLY HO area. The General also pointed out to his operations staff, "It is evident to me that a change in tactics will be necessary if we continue to use Ols in that area. As I have previously stated, I don't want to expose these FACs to the hot area. It appears we may be extending them." He directed his operations staff to get together with Intelligence, and on the basis of information regarding the concentration and caliber of AAA weapons, make a recommendation regarding the limitations to be placed on OIE operations

[REDACTED]

in the TALLY HO area. <sup>61/</sup> Subsequently, the limits of a safe operation area for the OLEs was identified, and directions were issued to the FACs <sup>62/</sup> not to penetrate beyond this line of limitation.

#### TRAFFIC CONGESTION

Another point of concern expressed by General Momyer was the density of traffic in the TALLY HO area. He told his Deputy for Operations: <sup>63/</sup>

"This morning I discussed with the people at Tally Ho their method of operation. They indicated traffic was getting so dense that some form of airborne control was mandatory. I was told that F-4s were attacking through the FACs. If this is correct, it is only a matter of time before a mid-air collision will result. I was of the impression the ABCCC for Tiger Hound could take care of Tally Ho. If my understanding is erroneous, give me a short briefing on how we are controlling traffic and what you propose to do to improve the situation."

At the beginning of TALLY HO, the primary control of strike aircraft during daylight hours was by the ABCCC aircraft positioned in the vicinity of the west end of the DMZ. At this position it was able to control strikes in both TIGER HOUND and TALLY HO. Because of the traffic congestion, however, additional measures were necessary. On August 2, the following actions were taken: (1) Armed reconnaissance sorties were given block times and separated by fifteen minute intervals to avoid conflict, (2) Reconnaissance sorties were assigned specific routes on which to travel, (3) A C-130 flareship formerly used in TIGER HOUND was assigned as ABCCC aircraft in the area and provided control capability for six hours during night operations, and (4) OLE aircraft were placed under positive, centralized control under the 20th



Fig. 4





TASS Commander. 64/

STRIKES 29 July - 4 August

During the week of July 29 through August 4, TALLY HO day strikes concentrated on supply areas, ammunition dumps and staging areas in the DMZ and along Route 102 and its tributary roads and trails. Over 200 structures were destroyed or damaged and over 75 secondary explosions were reported. Night strike efforts concentrated on traffic on Routes 1A, 100 and 101 and surveillance of coastal storage points and transshipment areas was maintained. It appeared that TALLY HO strikes had destroyed or severely damaged most of the base areas and ammunition dumps of the 324th B Division operating in the DMZ area. The combined pressures of allied units forced the 324 B Division to retreat into the DMZ during the latter part of July. When HASTINGS was finally terminated on August 3, at least 824 enemy had been killed in action and an additional 14 captured. 65/

On three successive days beginning August 3, B-52 Arc Light strikes were conducted in the DMZ. Six B-52s made strikes on each day, dropping a total of 324 tons of 500 and 1000 pound bombs. These strikes were made in support of Operation HASTINGS. Damage assessment was difficult to make as there was no ground follow through in the DMZ. 66/ The international Control Commission (ICC) voiced some concern over these strikes and were looking into the matter, but the RVN government had notified the ICC on July 20 that the NVN forces were violating the neutrality of DMZ. The US government had authorized air strikes in the DMZ based on firm

[REDACTED]

evidence that the enemy was using the area for military operations. <sup>67/</sup>

#### VNAF PARTICIPATION

Ground operations against VC/NVN forces infiltrating into the RVN across the DMZ or operating from the DMZ were directed by JCS to continue to take place south of the DMZ to the maximum extent possible. However, US/FWMAF forces were authorized to maneuver in the DMZ south of the demarcation line while in contact with these forces, or when such engagement was imminent, as necessary for friendly forces preservation. The State Department further directed that ground forces would not advance north of the Demarcation Line under any circumstances, and would withdraw south of the DMZ when contact with the enemy was broken. He pointed out that it was of the greatest importance that any action taken in the DMZ not be construed as anything other than self defense or as indicating any intentions to extend ground action into NVN. <sup>68/</sup>

Realizing that it would be difficult to withhold authority for RVNAF units similar to that granted US/FWMAF units, State Department officials were concerned that RVNAF would be less careful in respecting the demarcation line. <sup>69/</sup> American Embassy officials in Saigon favored RVNAF participation on the same basis as for US/FWMAF troops. While there was some risk in this, the Embassy officials stated that there was no real basis for not permitting them the same authority as US troops. They considered that COMUSMACV could control the situation to prevent any violation of the rules. CINCPAC concurred with the Embassy's view. The rationale was that the exclusion of the RVN would undermine any justification of actions as defense against enemy activity in the DMZ. It

[REDACTED]

would infringe on RVNAF right to take action in self defense. Unilateral US action in the DMZ could be exploited by communist propaganda as evidence that the US was escalating the war and was invading NVN. <sup>70/</sup>

CINCPAC was advised by the JCS on August 6 that US military personnel in positions to influence operations in or near the DMZ by RVNAF would make every reasonable effort to assure that such operations were by US/FWMAF forces. It was further directed that RVNAF forces be enjoined to maneuver into the southern portion of the DMZ only when in contact with the enemy, or when such engagement was imminent as necessary for preservation of the force. The same rules which applied to US/FWMAF forces would apply. VNAF was authorized to conduct air strikes in the DMZ, only when such operations had been coordinated in advance with US/FWMAF operations, or was essential to the preservation of its own force. <sup>71/</sup>

VNAF conducted a few strikes in the TALLY HO area, in the western sector beginning late July. The sector defined for VNAF operations was known as the Blackeye area. They conducted 38 strike sorties in the area, before General Momyer directed that they be withdrawn. The VNAF strikes were not controlled by TALLY HO FACs, and coordination and control requirements dictated that VNAF not operate in the area. <sup>72/</sup>

#### FAC ACCOUNTS OF OPERATIONS

Although there were occasions when flights were required to release their ordnance at higher altitudes resulting in less accuracy, TALLY HO FACs spoke highly of both USAF and USMC strike pilots. One FAC recalled controlling a group of Marine F4s who he believed "should have some award for their gallantry." "It was on July 27," he said. "These characters

[REDACTED]  
(This Page is [REDACTED])

had no cannons or anything to protect them and they went right on in after the guns ... straight in ... and they sounded real jubilant when they could see the target. Better than four 50 calibers shooting at them, but they bored right after them anyway. They said their guns had been shipped down south so they came in anyway without them ... only had 1,000 pounders to drop on the target. On the second pass, the wing man dropped bombs about five meters from one gun position. He took a hit. The leader took him out over the water, inspected his aircraft, discovered a 50 caliber hole through his air intake, told him to go on home, /but he insisted/ he was coming back after them. He returned and dropped the rest of his bombs on the target." <sup>73/</sup>

Another FAC recalled that on July 30 as he was returning from a mission, Hillsboro "come up with an extra flight of F4Cs which had been diverted from another area." He stated: "We continued to brief the two F4Cs, informing them we would pick out a target standing back and hopefully when they rolled in they would draw ground fire. The first marking, without my knowledge of it, landed pretty close to three fifty caliber machine guns. Since it wasn't where I wanted it to go, I marked a more visible target, two large white structures. Buckshot Lead said he had a bead on the target, rolled in and the sky was literally filled with fifty caliber tracers. He drove the two bombs home and damaged the two structures, We didn't see where the fire was coming from, and he offered to make a dry pass to draw fire. They were shooting fifty calibers, and that was an invitation to disaster as far as I was concerned. As it turned out, he did not have to go in and draw fire, because Hound Dog 65

[REDACTED]  
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**[REDACTED]**

marked it. As the F4C pilot rolled in for his second pass with 1000 pound bombs, he got a tallyho on the gun positions with the fifty caliber tracers coming up at him, and planted one about ten meters from the gun crew. I'm sure he wiped out the positions, plus their crews." <sup>74/</sup>

Throughout the week of August 5 - 11, the TALLY HO day effort concentrated on enemy supply and bivouac areas in the DMZ and along Routes 102 and 103. Armed reconnaissance sorties maintained the interdiction effort against bridges and fords on the primary coastal routes within the TALLY HO area. FACs detected many new trails in the DMZ, including communications sites, troop areas, ammunition dumps and storage areas. Night strikes concentrated on the coastal areas and were very successful in attacking boats, transshipment points and trucks. Forty-one watercraft were destroyed or damaged and numerous secondary explosions and fires were reported. <sup>75/</sup>

#### MARKET TIME INCIDENT

An unfortunate incident on the night of August 11 threw a temporary shadow over night operations against watercraft in TALLY HO. On this night, a US Coast Guard vessel, the Point Welcome, was mistakenly fired upon by USAF aircraft killing two crewmen and wounding five others. During the evening of August 10 and the early morning hours of August 11, the Point Welcome was on station in the northwest corner of the coastal waters of the RVN. It was engaged in Market Time operations, which basically involved the surveillance, boarding and searching of vessels suspected of attempting to land in the RVN. As part of TALLY HO, various USAF and USA

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aircraft flew in the area at the same time. The C-130 Blind Bat was serving as airborne command post and flare ship. Two B-57s and two F4Cs were in the area awaiting orders from Blind Bat to attack targets which might be assigned. 76/

An Army OV1B flying in a northerly direction approximately three to five miles off shore observed on radar probable boats near the mouth of the Ben Hai River. Since he was completing his flight for the night, the pilot passed the possible targets to another OV1. This Spud also picked up radar images of unknown boats near the mouth of the Ben Hai River and informed Blind Bat of this fact. After being informed of the boats, Blind Bat moved from his position northwest of Cape Bui Lay southeast to a position near the mouth of the Ben Hai River. Picking up on radar the image of what was thought to be a large vessel, Blind Bat passed the area to the east, turned back around to the west, and made a flare pass on a northerly heading over the area where it was thought that the suspected boat was located. It dropped four flares. In the illumination of the flares, the boat was observed. A second flare pass was made. Two more flares were dropped, one aerial and one surface. A third pass was made with flares being dropped approximately every two and one-half minutes. 77/

Below the flares, the Point Welcome was drifting with no lights, keeping several boats in the area under surveillance. Since the vessel did not respond to three flare passes and did not turn on its running lights, it was considered to be an enemy target. The B-57s, call sign Yellowbird, were ordered to strike the target. The F4Cs, call sign Coyote, also made three passes, doing considerable damage to the boat. It was later found

**SECRET**

that all damage, or almost all, was caused by 20mm cannon fire since the bulk of the CBU's and both bombs missed the target. <sup>78/</sup>

Immediately following the incident, the 7AF Commander ordered a complete investigation. Colonel Carl E. Taylor, USAF, was assigned as Investigating Officer. After an extensive investigation of the incident, Colonel Taylor found that "this incident was caused in large part by an overlap in areas of responsibility in TALLY HO and Market Time." He <sup>79/</sup> further reported:

"...Prior to Tally Ho, under normal conditions, Market Time vessels did not go north. The Point Welcome was drifting just below the 17th Parallel. It had every right to be there. Aircrew members did not know friendly vessels operated within these waters. Coast Guard members were not aware of Tally Ho operations and did not have reason to immediately suspect they were being challenged by flares.

There were no established procedures to be used by the Air Force aircraft to challenge Market Time vessels as such. When Tally Ho began, an existing MAROPS challenge procedure was adopted for aircraft to use in relation to MAROPS vessels. This procedure was not used by aircraft prior to or during the attack. Rules of Engagement for Tally Ho do not contain any specific identification procedures to be used. They only require that a target be identified as a military target before being attacked. Under these rules the method of identification was left to the discretion of the pilot. Although AF personnel did not use the MAROPS ID procedures, they clearly considered that dropping of flares over the vessel was a challenge.

The CG personnel did not know the correct MAROPS challenge/response procedures for air to surface. Market Time vessels were given two means of identifying themselves to aircraft: (1) by turning on running lights, or (2) by communicating verbally. The vessel did neither...."

Certain positive action was taken to preclude this type of incident in the future. Hq 7AF revised the rules of engagement applied to TALLY HO and such revised rules were transmitted to all activities on August 13.



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On August 14, MACV issued a directive requiring additional action relating to Market Time operations. On August 21, the Air Force received and re-transmitted to the field a message from the Commander, Task Force 115, which established a new marking procedure on Market Time vessels and provided for closer coordination between services. <sup>80/</sup>

During the week following the Market Time incident, TALLY HO night strikes along the coastal waters and routes yielded the bulk of secondary explosions. Mohawk SLAR and C-130 flare ships continued to detect and control strikes against moving targets and suspected transshipment points. It was found that boat traffic at night had increased, while the enemy had adopted a random pattern for off-loading. <sup>81/</sup>

OPERATIONS 22 AUGUST - 31 AUGUST 1966

TALLY HO FACs continued to report heavy activity along Route 102 and its adjacent trail network through the Tally Ho area and the DMZ. Heavy foot traffic was reported on the roads and trails, and many bunkers, structures and defensive positions were observed. FAC-directed strikes yielded many secondary explosions, the majority of which by type indicated that ammunition was being destroyed. <sup>82/</sup>

On August 22, FACs detected two trucks on Route 103 north of the DMZ. Air strikes were called in and produced one secondary explosion. On the following day the FAC returned to the same area and directed more strikes which yielded six trucks destroyed and seven damaged. FACs observed 28 large secondary explosions. It appeared that several of the trucks were loaded with ammunition and supplies because they were still burning 24 hours after the strike. <sup>83/</sup> Air strikes continued to pound this target

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for six days. A total of 46 aircraft, including B-57s, A1Es, F4Cs and USMC F4Bs and A4Es, participated in the strikes. Results included eight more trucks destroyed, two secondary explosions and thirteen secondary fires, nineteen bunkers destroyed and three damaged, and 200 feet of trenchwork uncovered. 84/ (See Photos, Fig. 5 and 6.)

Another lucrative target was struck on August 23, after a FAC discovered a suspected ammunition storage area in the DMZ. He requested heavy bombs to open up the canopy and the first flight of F4Cs triggered off 35 secondary explosions which were equivalent to 750 or 1000 pound bombs. These explosions were heard at the FAC base at Dong Ha, some 15 miles away. Follow-on strikes touched off an additional 20 explosions. 85/

Throughout the week beginning August 19, the OV1B SLAR aircraft detected a number of moving targets near the coast at night. These were struck by F4C aircraft, resulting in several trucks destroyed and accompanying secondary explosions. 86/ On the night of August 25, twenty-two aircraft touched off 24 explosions and reported 52 secondary fires. 87/ Night VR reports indicated light to moderate use of Routes 102 and 103 by truck traffic. During good moonlight, the trucks drove without headlights at speeds of approximately 30 MPH. Night SLAR indicated continued use of the coastal routes by vehicular traffic. Daytime VR indicated increased trail activity in the western portion of the DMZ. Supplies were apparently coming by truck on Route 103, then portered south into the DMZ. Route 102, within the DMZ, continued to have considerable foot track activity, new trench networks and bunkers. 88/

Late on August 30, Hound Dog 60 called a flight of Marine F4Bs in

[REDACTED]

on a suspected truck park north of the DMZ. Poor visibility due to smoke and near darkness prevented the FAC from accurately assessing the flight's damage to the target at that time, and he returned to Dong Ha. Upon returning to the target area early on the next day, it was apparent that the Marine's strike ordnance had contributed significantly to holding the truck convoy in its position all night. In addition to destroying two and possibly three trucks, the F4Bs had also inflicted major damage on the remainder of the 12 to 14 trucks in the convoy. Apparently the heavy damage had prevented the convoy from moving out during the night, and a lucrative target was readily available for additional strikes. The trucks were very large ones, and were lined bumper to bumper in line, which made the earlier strikes more effective. The flight rippled their bombs up and down the column. 89/

Hound Dog 60 immediately called for strikes. Two A1Es came in on the first run with 1000 pound bombs, 100 pound WP, five inch rockets and 20mm cannon fire. They destroyed four trucks, started a large POL storage fire and triggered nine secondary explosions. "An excellent job of bombs, rockets and strafe," the FAC reported. Fifteen minutes later, two F8s were directed in with four 2000 pound bombs, five inch rockets and 20mm fire. The F8s destroyed another truck, started a large storage fire, and set off three large secondary explosions and numerous small secondaries. These were followed by two F4Cs striking the target with incendiary. Stores remaining on six truck beds were destroyed and one large stores fire was started. Three flights of A4s, A1Es and B57s were also called into the target, and final results showed that 12 trucks were destroyed and two

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POST STRIKE

TRUCKS




Fig. 5

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PRE STRIKE

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90/

heavily damaged, and considerable POL and ammunition stores were destroyed.

CONCLUSION

Still in the preliminary stage of operations as of the end of August, the Tally Ho program was still being pursued aggressively. There was strong evidence that a large enemy force had enjoyed some success in infiltrating through the DMZ into the RVN since Tally Ho operations were begun. FACs continued to report that heavy foot traffic was moving through the area. Actual movement was not being detected during daylight hours, as the enemy was moving at night. <sup>91/</sup> An NVA sergeant, who was captured on August 24, stated that the majority of the 324th B Division was "presently" located in the DMZ. The division continued to be charged with the mission of "seizing and liberating" Quang Tri province. <sup>92/</sup> Evidence continued to accumulate that the NVA was preparing for major operations in Quang Tri province. Both the 324th B Division and another division were apparently in a position to participate in these operations, and it was believed that the month of September would be a period of unusually high activity in Route Package 1 and TALLY HO. <sup>93/</sup>

One obvious drawback was the fact that TALLY HO aircraft could not strike targets unless these were clearly identified as military in nature. The enemy were experts at using the civilian environment to hide their operations. By the end of August, the "roll back" concept had not been consummated. The eastern portion of the TALLY HO area was still not permissive to OLE operations. Strike sorties had remained constant--- approximately 82 fragged daily. The TALLY HO area was small and had



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definite boundaries. There was just so much that could be put into the area. Within these confines, the TALLY HO air effort was producing favorable results. As of August 28, 536 structures had been destroyed and 361 were damaged. Twenty bridges had been destroyed and 36 damaged; 32 vehicles had been destroyed and 29 damaged. Air strikes had knocked out 27 AAA/AW positions. There had been 806 secondary explosions and 69 KBA. Also, there were five landslides caused by these strikes, and 190 fords, ferry slips and road segments had either been cratered, cut or seeded. TALLY HO operations had been successful in restricting motorable travel and had forced the enemy into a much slower and more cumbersome logistics effort -- coolie-type portage. In addition to this was the psychological impact on the enemy. Hitting the enemy right in his own backyard at the end of the trail into the RVN was obviously demoralizing to the enemy forces. Air operations in the TALLY HO area were the subject of considerable attention by the 7th Air Force Commander and his operations staff. They were directing a great deal of thought and effort toward increasing the program's effectiveness. The success of the program was yet to be determined. The degree of its success would be decided by whether or not the enemy was able to mount a major offensive <sup>94/</sup> in Quang Tri province by infiltrating through the TALLY HO area.

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## TALLY HO

### LEGEND

1. LOCATED IN 'BLACKEYE AREA' WHERE VNAF ACFT FLEW SEVERAL MISSIONS, TARGET 1412 WAS THE FIRST STRUCK 20 JUL.
2. RF-4C WAS DOWNED 27 JUL.
3. ALTHOUGH ENTIRE EASTERN AREA WAS HEAVILY DEFENDED, THESE REPRESENT HEAVIEST GUN CONCENTRATIONS DURING FIRST WEEKS OF TALLY HO.
4. O-1E PILOTED BY LT/COL ABERSOLD WAS HIT HERE.
5. ON SAME DATE, ANOTHER O-1E WAS HIT AT THIS LOCATION.
6. LARGE AMMO DUMP HIT ON 25, 26 JULY.
7. LARGE TRUCK PARK STRUCK ON 30, 31 AUGUST.
8. USCG POINT WELCOME WAS MISTAKENLY STRUCK BY U.S. AIRCRAFT.

\* DOTTED LINE DOWN CENTER OF AREA SHOWS THE ORIGINAL LINE OF LIMITATION PLACED ON O-1E'S. FACS WERE LIMITED TO THE WESTERN SECTOR. SOLID LINE DOWN CENTER DEPICTS FURTHER LIMITATION PLACED ON FACS AFTER 1 AUG TO KEEP THEM IN PERMISSIVE AREA.




FIGURE 7

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



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APPENDIX 1

CHRONOLOGY OF OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR CAMPAIGN

8 May 1964	The Yankee Team program, a series of reconnaissance missions over Laos, was begun at the request of the Royal Laotian government.
14 Dec 1964	Barrel Roll operations were begun. Aircraft launched from bases in the RVN began flying over Laos for interdiction and support of Laotian government forces against the Pathet Laos.
7 Feb 1965	Flaming Dart retaliatory raids were begun against North Vietnam (NVN). In this program the U.S. government demonstrated that it would strike back immediately and decisively with airpower when provoked by serious acts of terrorism and assault in the RVN.
2 Mar 1965	Under the Rolling Thunder program, U.S. jet aircraft, in an effort to weaken the enemy's logistics system, began striking targets in NVN on a continuing basis.
3 Apr 1965	The Steel Tiger program of interdiction was begun in the southern half of the Barrel Roll area. Steel Tiger forces concentrated on severing enemy lines of infiltration through the southern portion of Laos into the RVN.
6 Dec 1965	Tiger Hound operations were begun over Laos. Tiger Hound forces were provided with the portion of the Steel Tiger area contiguous to the RVN border for surveillance and strikes.
1 May 1966	Gateguard operations were begun north of the 18th parallel. This interdiction program provided surveillance and strikes in Route Package 1 in NVN and the north Steel Tiger area in Laos.
20 Jul 1966	Tally Ho operations commenced. A follow-on to the Tiger Hound program, area denial operations under the Tally Ho concept began in the southern perimeter of Route Package 1 in NVN. Two days later, JCS authority was received to conduct air strikes against enemy positions in the DMZ.

APPENDIX 2  
STATUS OF TALLY HO

PERIOD 20 July - 31 Aug 66

STRIKE A/C			CANCELLED				DIVERTED					
FRAGGED	ADD-ON	TOTAL	BASE WX	TGT WX	MAINT	OTHER	PRIORITY	WX	OTHER	NON-EX	STRIKE	SERVICE
1312	24	1336	10	49	41	47		12	7	34	1136	USMC
884	133	1017		22	5	24		20	12		934	USAF
	19	19									19	USMC N*
964	57	1021		8	14	27			1	62	909	USAF N
414	36	450		8	6	8	2	6	4	10	406	A1E
3574	269	3843	10	87	66	106	2	38	24	106	3404	TOTAL

			CANCELLED				DIVERTED					
FRAGGED	ADD-ON	TOTAL	BASE WX	TGT WX	MAINT	OTHER	PRIORITY	WX	OTHER	NON-EX	STRIKE	SERVICE
414	36	450		8	6	8	2	6	14		406	A1E (FAC)
57		57									57	Blind Bat
139		139				8					131	OV-1
479		479				42					437	O-1
1089	36	1125		8	6	58	2	6	14		1031	TOTAL

\* - Night

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## APPENDIX 3

### TALLY HO

Hits on Aircraft

31 August 1966

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACFT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>HIT BY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
20 Jul	B-57	1659/10638	Lt AAA	Hit in left rear fuselage damaged hydraulic system
20 Jul	F-4C	1705/10659	37mm	Hit in windshield
21 Jul	F-4C	1704/10658	50 Cal	Hit in right wing
21 Jul	O1E	XE 588083	30 Cal	Hit in rear fuselage
29 Jul	A1E	XD 9978	30 Cal	
31 Jul	FAC	XD 9492	SA	Hits - Wing flap, Nose vent
1 Aug	O1E	YD 0276	AAA or AW	Removed four feet of wing, crash landed Dong Ha, Pilot OK.
1 Aug	O1E	YD 001844	30 & 50 Cal	Hits in engine - pilot wounded
3 Aug	B-57	Est. 1703/10659	SA	Hole in Stabilizer
5 Aug	B-57	Est. 1716/10645	50 Cal	Hit in left fuel tank
5 Aug	B-57	Est. 1705/10645	50 Cal	2 Hits - No 2 engine, Right wing
7 Aug	B-57	Est. 1702/10706	SA	Hit in belly of A/C lost hydraulics - Belly landing at Da Nang
9 Aug	B-57	1702/10701	50 Cal	1 Hit
12 Aug	F-4B	1702/10700	50 Cal	Minor damage - one hit
31 Aug	F-4C	1708/10658	AW	3 holes in wing BLC damaged

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TALLY HO

Aircraft Losses

31 August 1966

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACFT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>HIT BY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
21 Jul	A-4C	1712/10741	37mm	Pilot rescued in gulf
27 Jul	RF-4C	1709/10658	37mm	Two pilots lost
1 Aug	O1E	Dong Ha	37mm	Crashed on landing after hit at YD 0276

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## FOOTNOTES

1. (S) Briefing for CINCPAC and COMUSMACV by Col. I. B. Jack Donalson, USAF, Tally Ho Task Force Commander, 2 Sep 66, Doc 1. /hereinafter cited as Donalson, Briefing/.
2. (S) 7AF Operations Order 453-67, Subj: Tally Ho, 17 Jul 66, Doc 2; Extract from Weekly Air Intelligence Summary, Jul 66, Doc 3.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. (S) Extract from Vol II, No 36, Weekly Air Intelligence Summary /hereinafter cited as WAIS/, Doc 4.
6. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CR 1501477, Subj: Operations in the DMZ, 15 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
7. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV MACCOC2 to CINCPAC, 24087/131250Z, Subj: Rules of Engagement for Vietnam DMZ, 13 Jul 66. On file MACVJ2.
8. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CR 1501477, Subj: Operations in the DMZ, 15 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
9. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, TS-J2 180833, Subj: Rules of Engagement for Vietnam DMZ, 18 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
10. (TS) Memorandum for Record by Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer, Commander 7AF, Subj: Concept of Operations for Tally Ho, 17 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC, /hereinafter cited as Gen Momyer's Memorandum for record/.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, TS 24711, Subj: Request for Authority for Air Operations in Route Package I, 18 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
15. (TS) Memorandum for the Record by MACJ03, Subj: Gen Westmoreland's Concept for the Initiation of Operation Tally Ho, MACTS00090726, 19 Jul 66, /hereinafter cited as MACJ03 Memorandum for Record/.
16. Ibid.

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17. (TS) Gen Momyer's Memorandum for Record; (TS) Interview with 1st Lt Donald P Evarts, Tally Ho Intelligence Officer, 5 Sep 66.
18. (S) Memorandum for DOPR, DOCO, TACC from DOP, Col Edward A. McGough, Subj: Operation Tally Ho, DO-66-01700, 18 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
19. (S) Memorandum by Col. C. M. Talbott, Subj: Status Report on Project Tally Ho, 17 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
20. (TS) Gen Momyer's Memorandum for Record.
21. (S) Interview by Warren A. Trest, Project CHECO, with Tally Ho FACs at Da Nang AB, 16 Aug 66, and Dong Ha AB, 17 Aug 66. Documents 5 thru 14, hereinafter cited as Interview Trest with Tally Ho FACs/.
22. (S) Interview by Warren A. Trest, with Major J D Brown, Tally Ho Chief of Strike Plans, 5 Sept 66, hereinafter cited as Interview Trest with Brown/.
23. (S) Msg 7AF to all Tally Ho Addressees, TACC-66-S09074, Subj: Tally Ho Frag Order 01, 20 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
24. (TS) Msg, 7AF to Tiger Hound Operations, Da Nang AB, TACC-TH 13942, Subj: Tally Ho Divert Aircraft, 13 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
25. (S) Msg, 7AF to Tally Ho Addressees, TACC-66-S-09221, Subj: Tally Ho Frag Order 10, 29 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
26. (S) Interview, Mr Warren Trest, Project CHECO, with Major Robert T. Smyth, Chief, FAC Detachment at Dong Ha AB, 17 Aug 66. Doc 5, hereinafter cited as Interview Trest with Smyth/.
27. Ibid.
28. (S) Memorandum, Major J. D. Brown to Col I. B. Jack Donalson, Subj: Tally Ho vs DMZ, undated, on file Hq 7AF, TACC.
29. (S) Msg, Tally Ho Dong Ha AB to 7AF TACC Tally Ho, 66-002, Subj: VR Results, 20 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
30. (S) Note initialled JWB inscribed on above message.
31. (S) Msg, 7AF to all Tally Ho Addressees, Subj: Tally Ho Frag Order 01, 20 Jul 66.
32. (S) Tally Ho Strike Log, on file at Hq 7AF, TACC.
33. (S) Interview, Mr Warren A. Trest, Project CHECO, with Capt John R. Clyde, Dong Ha AB, 17 Aug 66, Doc 6.

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35. Ibid.
36. (S) Interview, Mr. Warren A. Trest, Project CHECO, with Capt Calvin C. Anderson, Dong Ha AB, 17 Aug 66, Doc 7, /hereinafter cited as Interview Trest with Anderson/.
37. (S) Extract from WAIS, Vol. II, No 30, 1 Aug 66, Doc 15.
38. (S) Interview Mr. Warren A. Trest, Project CHECO, with LtCol Edward Abersold, 16 Aug 66, Doc 8, /hereinafter cited as Interview Trest with Abersold/.
39. Ibid.
40. (S) Daily work sheets by Tally Ho Intelligence Staff, Hq 7AF TACC.
41. (S) Interview, Trest with Smyth, Doc 5.
42. Ibid.
43. (S) Interview, Trest with Anderson, Doc 8.
44. Ibid.
45. (S) Weekly Intelligence Summary, 131st Av Co (AS), 25 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
46. (S) Weekly Intelligence Summary, 131st Av Co (AS), 21 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
47. (S) Interview, Trest with Abersold, Doc. 8.
48. (S) Interview, Trest with Smyth, Doc. 5.
49. (S) Interview, Trest with Abersold, Doc. 8.
50. (S) Interview, Trest with Smyth, Doc. 5.
51. Ibid.
52. (TS) Memorandum, LtGen W. W. Momyer to 7AF DO, Subj: ABCCC for Tally Ho 1 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC, /hereinafter cited Memo, LtGen Momyer to DO, 1 Aug 66/.
53. (TS) Memorandum, Col I. B. Jack Donalson, to Col C. M. Talbott, Subj: LtGen Momyer's 1 Aug memo, 3 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC, /hereinafter cited as Memo, Col Donalson to Col Talbott 3 Aug 66/.

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54. (S) Interview, Trest with Brown, 5 Sep 66.
55. (S) Interview, Trest with Tally Ho FACs, Doc. 5 thru 14.
56. (S) Interview, Trest with Anderson, Doc 7.
57. (S) Interview Mr. Warren A. Trest, Project CHECO, with Capt Bronwood Harrison, Doc. 9.
58. Ibid.
59. (S) Interview, Trest with Abersold, Doc. 8.
60. Ibid.
61. (S) Memo, LtGen Momyer to DO, 1 Aug 66.
62. (S) Memo, Col Donalson to Col Talbott, 3 Aug 66.
63. (S) Memo, LtGen Momyer to DO, 1 Aug 66.
64. (S) Memo, Col Donalson to Col Talbott, 3 Aug 66.
65. (S) Extract from WAIS, Vol II, No. 31, 8 Aug 66, Doc. 16.
66. (S) Interview Mr. Trest with Capt. Thomas Dempsey, Strike Plans, Hq 7AF TACC, 5 Sep 66.
67. (TS) Msg, CINCPACAF to 7AF, TS, DO30315, Subj: Rules of Engagement for Vietnam DMZ, 22 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
68. (TS) Msg, Sec State Wash DC to American Embassy Saigon, Subj: Defensive Operations of Ground Units in DMZ South of Demarcation Line, 30 Jul 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
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70. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, TS Tango 14, Subj: Policy Relative to GVN Military Operations in DMZ, 1 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
71. (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, TS JCS 8550, Subj: RVNAF Military Operations in DMZ, 6 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
72. (S) Interview, Trest with Brown, 5 Sep 66.
73. (S) Interview, Mr. Warren A. Trest, Project CHECO, with Capt Jim Kirwin, 17 Aug 66. Doc. 10.
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76. (S) Report of Investigation re: An Attack Against a Coast Guard Boat on 11 Aug 66 on the Ben Hai River, RVN, by Col Carl E. Taylor, Investigating Officer, Hq 7AF TACC. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
77. Ibid.
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80. Ibid.
81. (S) Extract from WAIS, Vol II, No. 32, 15 Aug 66, Doc. 17.
82. Ibid.
83. (S) Extract from WAIS, Vol II, No. 34, 29 Aug 66, Doc. 19.
84. (S) Briefing for CINCPAC and COMUSMACV by Col Donalson, 2 Sep 66, Doc. 1.
85. Ibid.
86. (S) Extract from WAIS, Vol II, No. 34, 29 Aug 66, Doc. 19.
87. (S) Daily work sheets by Tally Ho Intelligence Staff, 7AF TACC.
88. (S) Extract from WAIS, Vol II, No. 36, 12 Sep 66, Doc. 21.
89. (C) Msg, Tally Ho Dong Ha to 7AF TACC, Confidential TH 66-060  
Subj: DISUM for 31 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
90. Ibid.
91. (S) Extract from WAIS, Vol II, No. 36, 12 Sep 66, Doc. 21.
92. (S) Msg, MACJ234 to 7AF TACC TH, Subj: NVA SITREP 9, 24 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
93. (S) Msg, MACJ234 to 7AF TACC TH, Subj: NVA SITREP 10, 24 Aug 66. On file Hq 7AF, TACC.
94. (TS) Interviews, Mr. Trest with Tally Ho Operations personnel, and comprehensive study of Tally Ho background, statistics and documents.

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7/11/57

7/11/57